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INTRODUCTION  
 
he privatization of public water utilities has been one of the most 
controversial aspects of neoliberal restructuring in the late 20th 
century. Powerful social movements that aim to protect water from 
corporate control have emerged across the planet, particularly in the global 
South. Since water privatization affects people from all walks of life many 
protests have been organized by broad-scale social movement coalitions which 
have included labour, environmental, consumer, social justice and indigenous 
groups. While public sector workers—arguably one of the constituencies most 
affected by water privatization policies—have participated in many of these 
coalitions, they have also played a controversial role. Preliminary research on 
workers’ responses in Latin America demonstrates that labour unions have 
employed a variety of strategies when faced with the privatization of public 
services, including active support and resistance (De la Garza Toledo 1991; 
Ducheim 1998; Murillo 2001; Novelli 2004).  
Based on two case studies from Peru and Bolivia, this paper investigates 
why certain unions of water workers and not others have sought to form deep 
coalitions with community groups when confronted by privatization. Although 
in both cases, trade unions decided to participate in coalitions with community 
groups, the political strategy of forming “deep coalitions” (Tattersall 2005) has 
emerged as a conscious practice in the case of the water workers’ union in Peru 
but not in Bolivia. Drawing from Kim Voss and Rachel Sherman’s (2000) study of 
revitalization amongst service unions in northern California, the paper argues 
that the reactions of these two public sector unions can be explained as the result 
of three factors. First, in both cases there have been internal crises which have led 
to new leadership. Second, these new leaders who come from outside the labour 
movement see decline as a mandate for change. Only in the Peruvian case, 
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however, has there been a strong union federation at the national level which 
supports innovative organizing practices.  
The first part of the paper discusses the prospects for building labour-
community coalitions in the water sector in order to engage with current debates 
on union revitalization and renewal. The second part of the paper contrasts the 
experiences of anti-privatization coalitions in Huancayo, Peru and Cochabamba, 
Bolivia. Research for this paper is based upon a review of trade union 
documentation, and observation of events organized by trade unions between 
February and May 2008 in Bolivia and Peru, as well as and 24 formal interviews 
with trade union and community leaders. 
 
DEBATES ON UNION REVITALIZATION AND RENEWAL IN LATIN 
AMERICA  
 
Public sector unions in Latin America have traditionally been unlikely 
candidates for studies of revitalization and renewal. Indeed, most studies of 
public sector unions’ reactions to neoliberal policies in Latin America have 
highlighted a politics of co-optation rather than resistance to privatization. 
Worker opposition was quickly neutralized in the privatizations of local water 
utilities in La Paz, Bolivia and Buenos Aires, Argentina, when the government 
offered to sell the workers shares in the new public utilities (Loftus and 
McDonald 2001; Spronk 2007). In her detailed study of the privatization in the 
Mexican telecommunications company Telmex, the largest privatization deal in 
the region in the 1990s, Judith Clifton (2000) describes how President Salinas 
worked together closely with union leaders to make the privatization process as 
smooth as possible. The union leadership exchanged guarantees to suppress 
dissent for government promises to minimize job losses. Political scientist 
Victoria Murillo (2000) similarly observed that due to strong corporatist ties 
forged between unions and political parties in Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela, 
union leaders often remained loyal to the party in power with the hopes that 
their collaboration with government would encourage the latter to mitigate the 
worst effects of neoliberal restructuring on union members.  
In contrast to the literature on renewal and revitalization on the Anglo-
Saxon democracies, studies of mobilization unionism in Latin America focus on 
the importance of establishing independent trade unions rather than on the 
expansion of union affiliation given the strong history of corporatism in the 
region (Antunes 2001; Bensusán and Cook 2003; Patroni 2004; Bensusán 2005; 
Ellner 2005).1 Although the average trade union density in the Latin American 
region has fallen considerably in the last twenty five years, unlike the Anglo-
Saxon democracies, density is a poor predictor of union strength in Latin 
America.2 As Maria Lorena Cook (2006: 21) notes, in the post-authoritarian 
contexts of Latin America, high density may simply reflect involuntary or 
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compulsory union membership, and is therefore “less meaningful as an 
indication of member commitment or mobilization capacity.” Indeed, as labour 
researchers Gabriela Bensusán and María Lorena Cook argue in their study of 
Mexico, labour revitalization is “not to be understood primarily in terms of new 
organizing or more mobilization, but rather in terms of: (1) the creation of a 
political-institutional framework that allows ‘real’ trade union activity; and (2) 
the presence of labour groups to take advantage of this framework” (Bensusán 
and Cook 2003: 229).  
Even in cases such as Bolivia and Peru in which ‘real,’ independent trade 
unions exist, public sector trade unions have rarely embraced a democratic, class 
struggle unionism. Indeed, popular images of militant, combative trade unions 
are based upon workers from export and manufacturing sectors who have 
fought victorious struggles against the state and capital.3 Oscar Olivera’s (2004) 
well-known account of the role of workers in the Cochabamba “Water War,” for 
example, depicts the protagonist role that manufacturing workers played in 
alliance with urban consumers and indigenous peasant organizations in the 
struggle to reverse privatization, but says nothing about the water workers’ 
union. As noted above, public sector trade unions have traditionally been deeply 
enmeshed in corporatist relationships with their employers contributing more 
generally to trade union decline (Balbi 1997; Arce 2001; Kruse 2001; Solfrini 2001). 
Yet, as neoliberalism has advanced, corporatist relations in the public sector have 
come under increasing strain as public employees face the constant threat of 
expulsion and wages and benefits have stagnated under neoliberal austerity 
policies.   
Public sector workers are uniquely positioned to form alliances with 
community groups given their dual construction as both “citizens” and 
“workers.” As Franco Barchiesi (2007) observes in the context of neoliberal 
reforms in South Africa, public sector workers face dual challenges originating 
from labour processes and the normative frameworks that govern the conditions 
of employment and services provision. Their juridical construction as “servants 
of the state” can be used by employers to both stigmatize and constrain wage 
militancy and collective bargaining at the same time as it facilitates the 
articulation of public sector workers’ tactics and demands on a directly political 
ground. Furthermore, limitations on collective bargaining and the right to strike 
also drive public sector workers towards political rather than industrial 
strategies (Maceira and Murillo 2001). In short, workers who provide a public 
service can easily frame arguments about protecting the “public good” in order 
to buttress the unions’ demands on moral grounds. 
In an uneven way, some public sector unions in Latin America have 
started to reposition themselves as active campaigning organizations. A number 
of political campaigns against neoliberal economic policies lead by public sector 
trade unions, including teachers’ and health workers’ unions, as well as unions 
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in the telecommunication, water, and electricity sectors (Frundt 2002; Murillo 
and Ronconi 2004; Novelli 2004; Hall, Lobina et al. 2005; Almeida 2006; Almeida 
2008). Many of these unions have adopted social movement tactics, such as the 
use of direct action and the formation of labour-community alliances. The 
following section examines two such cases of resistance to privatization in the 
water sector in Peru and Bolivia. 
 
WATER PRIVATIZATION AND THE WATER WORKERS’ UNIONS IN 
PERU AND BOLIVIA 
 
In April 2000, residents of Cochabamba, Bolivia, managed to expel the 
private, foreign-led consortium that had taken over the city’s water system just 
six months before. Outraged at the exorbitant increases in water prices and 
convinced that access to clean water was a basic human right and a gift from the 
Pachamama (an Andean earth deity), residents of Cochabamba and the 
surrounding region violently opposed the plans to “lease the rain” by taking to 
the streets in protests known as the “Water War” (Finnegan 2002). The coalition 
that was formed to coordinate the protests—the Coordinadora—brought 
together groups from different social classes, including rural peasants, formal 
and informal urban workers, each of which had different reasons for 
participating in the struggle.  
While the water workers participated in the coalition, as the Secretary 
General at the time put it, they supported the struggle by “showing up for work” 
(Author interview, July 2005). While many individual workers supported the 
coalition, the union leadership failed to make any public statements against 
privatization until the battle was over. The relationships between union leaders 
and community members that were formed during the heat of battle were 
distant. As a result, the coalition between organized workers and other members 
of the community was short-lived. The union leaders whom I talked to during 
my investigation in 2005 showed very little interest in supporting community 
demands for expanded water services. For example, one day I arrived at 
SEMAPA to find workers in their blue uniforms lolling around the grounds of 
the water utility. When I asked General Secretary Cardona why no one was at 
work, he told me that the union decided in an emergency morning assembly that 
no worker would leave the premises that day to avoid being confronted by angry 
residents. That day, poor neighbourhoods of the Southern zone who lacked 
water services organized a march to protest the corruption in SEMAPA and the 
failure of the utility to expand services to their neighbourhoods in the poor, 
southern zone of the city. Five years after the Water War as tensions grew 
between the workers’ unions and the community associations representing users, 
the relationship between the Coordinadora and the official union leadership 
broke down completely. 
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As noted by researcher Philipp Terhorst (2003), tensions between the 
SEMAPA workers’ union and the Coordinadora emerged early on during the 
transition period after the Water War (April 2000 to April 2002) when the utility 
was returned to municipal control. Building on the experience of the Water War, 
the Coordinadora put forward radical proposals to decentralize and democratize 
the management of the utility in order to give the community more control over 
decision, known locally as “social control” (see Driessen 2008). As Terhorst 
writes, “The change process created pressure for change and uncertainty for the 
workforce…. Majority control by citizens was too far reaching for the workers to 
accept” (2003: 76). Indeed, the SEMAPA workers’ union blocked the 
Coordinadora’s proposal, instead supporting the proposal by the Mayor which 
would reduce community control to a minimum. While many of the 
Coordinadora activists remained committed in principle to the notion that 
workers had an important role to play in the public-social utility, “the workers 
seemed to be less willing to join the change process than could have been wished 
and anticipated” (2003: 65).  
By mid-2005, the Coordinadora came to see the union as a barrier 
preventing the possibility of implementing “real” social control within the public 
utility. One of the major problems has been the bloating of the public utility with 
excessive staff. In 1997, SEMAPA employed 4.7 workers per 1000 connections 
(Nickson and Vargas 2002: 104). By December 2003, the Superintendent of Basic 
Services reported that this number had jumped to 11.5. The tripling of the staff 
became a public concern in 2005 because it jeopardized the next instalment of a 
US$11 million loan offered by the Inter-American Development Bank, which was 
needed for system expansion. At the time, it was difficult to get an accurate 
picture of the utility’s financial situation because the representative of the union 
on the Board of Directors was also the Director of Finances, making it impossible 
to pinpoint financial “leaks” within the company. To make matters worse, the 
union had a lot to hide. The corrupt union leadership was suspected of running a 
system of clandestine connections that was estimated to cost the utility almost 
$100,000 a month in lost revenue.  
Although the alliance between labour and community groups 
immediately before the Water War may have been short-lived, the relationships 
between community organizations and the union forged have opened up the 
possibilities of renewal coming from the rank-and-file. Since 2002, loose ties 
between the Coordinadora and insurgents from the rank-and-file were 
maintained through “Banderas,” a young activist with close links to the 
Coordinadora who was hired by the water company shortly after the Water War. 
Initially hired as a general labourer, Banderas has helped to create an insurgent 
force within the public sector union which eventually succeeded in overthrowing 
the corrupt, mafia-type leadership that ran the union for over twenty years 
(Author interview, February 2008).  
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Thanks to these counter-organizing efforts of insurgents within the union, 
the head of the union “mafia” was fired in October 2005 for organizing an illegal 
strike that aimed to protest the dismissal of the corrupt general manager. For the 
first time in over twenty-five years, the elections that were held to replace him 
were conducted using secret-ballot. Members also had a choice between two 
platforms of candidates. Nine out of ten members turned out to vote; over 70% of 
the members voted for the new leadership (Author interview, Secretary General 
of the SEMAPA union, February 2008). While it is yet unclear as to whether this 
truly indicates a new direction within the SEMAPA union, it is an important step 
on the road to union democracy. 
A similar anti-privatization backlash to the Cochabamba “Water War” 
ensued five years later in Huancayo, Peru. In March 2005, a vibrant movement 
made up of a defensive front of the residents of Huancayo and the surrounding 
region—the water workers’ union, associations of market workers and parents’ 
associations, and irrigating farmers—fiercely opposed the privatization of the 
local water utility, SEDAM-Huancayo. Protests reached their climax with a city-
wide strike on March 30 involving over 15,000 people, which successfully 
pressured the local government to back down and to cancel plans for 
privatization. In this case, the public sector trade union, the Single Union of 
Potable Water Workers of Huancayo (Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de Agua 
Potable de Huancayo, SUTAPAH), played a leading role in the struggle, actively 
seeking to build and sustain the coalition with community leaders, represented 
by the Water Defense Front of the Junin Region (Frente de Defensa del Agua – 
Region Junin, the Frente). After the initial victory, the demand for and 
development of a public alternative turned into a central aspect of the Frente’s 
and the union’s work (Terhorst 2008). 
The two contrasting experiences with labour-community coalitions 
suggest that not all coalitions are created equal. The level of interaction between 
community and unions can indicate degrees of revitalization and renewal. In 
Amanda Tatersall’s (2005) terms, the close, collaborative relationship between 
SUTAPAH and the Frente that emerged in Huancayo is an example of a “deep 
coalition,” while the relationship between the water workers’ union and other 
community organizations within the Coordinadora represents a short-lived 
“support coalition.” Deep coalitions “facilitate long-term relationships between 
unions and community organisations, where the breadth of activity between 
groups is complemented by a depth of activity by participating organizations,” 
while support coalitions “operate as short-term, structured coalitions between 
unions and community organizations” (Tattersall 2005: 107, 100).  
The collaborative relationship between the union and community groups 
in Huancayo is based upon a set of perceived mutual interest. Thanks to support 
from the national trade union federation and global unions, SUTAPAH provides 
the Frente with financial resources while the latter is able to mobilize public 
170   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society – Volume 14 – Autumn 2009 
support for campaigns and events due to its deep links with different community 
organizations such as community kitchens, parents’ associations, and the 
irrigating peasant organizations. Personal relationships have developed between 
high ranking members in both organizations. In Huancayo, the Secretary General 
of SUTAPAH (Josefina Gabriel) and the President of the Frente (Nelly Avendaño 
Roca) have worked together actively since 2005 to coordinate political campaigns 
and public education events in the region on issues related to reform of the 
public utility. When the Frente lost its office space last year due to a lack of 
funds, the union allocated it space within their building next to the water 
company. Over time, the relationship between the two organizations has 
deepened, although the Frente is still looking for its own office space which will 
allow it to maintain its autonomy (Author Interview, Nelly Avendaño Roca, May 
2008). Initial collaborations focused on public education campaigns to raise 
awareness about the dangers of privatization and direct action campaigns to 
reverse the decision of the municipal governments to privatize the water 
company, including the broad-scale mobilizations noted above.  
While new leaders with a mandate for change have emerged within the 
trade unions in Cochabamba, Bolivia and Huancayo, Peru, the union’s decision 
to pursue a deep coalition in the latter was largely the initiative of the national 
federation, which has been fighting for almost two decades to rebuild trade 
unionism in the water sector. Previous to the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, 
urban water services in Peru were supplied by a central company that was 
managed by the federal government. The arrival of the repressive neoliberal 
Fujimori administration meant dramatic changes in public services and labour 
relations. At the beginning of the 1990s, the water sector of Peru was reorganized 
under the Fujimori dictatorship, with collaboration by the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). In April 1990, the centralized state 
company was dissolved and the sector was divided between urban and rural 
areas. Under the decentralization program, 54 new municipal water companies 
were created. Responsibility for ownership and management of these operations 
was transferred to municipal governments (with the exception of the water 
company in Lima, which remains property of the central government).  
Both before and after decentralization, water workers in Peru have been 
represented by a national trade union federation—the Federación Nacional de 
Trabajadores de Agua Potable (FENTAP). Established in 1981, today FENTAP 
represents over 8000 water workers across the country. In the 1990s, however, 
FENTAP found itself fighting not only against the government’s neoliberal 
privatization agenda, but to maintain its organizational integrity. Following 
decentralization in 1990, the number of members affiliated to FENTAP dropped 
dramatically due to two changes in the labour law enacted by the Fujimori 
government: union pluralism allowed for the formation of more than one union 
in one workplace and ended union officer protection, which made it much easier 
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for employers to get rid of union leaders by refusing to grant them leave to 
perform their executive duties (Cook 2006: 122). Forming labour-community 
alliances is part of FENTAP’s strategy to regain the confidence of water workers 
so that the organization can rebuild its membership base (Author interview, Luis 
Isarra, May 2008). FENTAP has spearheaded several successful campaigns to 
prevent or rollback the government’s privatization agenda. Besides Huancayo, 
FENTAP has formed common fronts with community organizations in five other 
regions of Peru: Piura, Tumbes, Lima, Huaral, and Pisco (Isarra and Donner 
2005).  
Leadership change is the second key factor which explains why water 
workers’ unions in Peru have repositioned themselves as active campaigning 
organizations. As noted above, FENTAP suffered an internal crisis in the early 
1990s due to the dramatic drop in the number of local affiliates that splintered off 
from the Federation during decentralization. Since FENTAP depends on 
voluntary contributions to fund its activities, the leadership has to work hard to 
demonstrate its responsiveness to the membership. The federation’s strong 
stance against privatization has been born out of a struggle to regain the 
confidence of its members. The existence of new leadership from outside of the 
labour movement is also a factor. One of the key architects of FENTAP’s new 
organizing strategy has been Luis Isarra, who has held various positions on the 
national executive for the past ten years and became the Secretary General in 
March 2005. As a young man, Isarra was active in the student movement during 
his studies of industrial and public relations at the Universidad Nacional de San 
Agustín in his hometown in Arequipa. Upon graduation, Isarra was hired by the 
public water company in Arequipa and has worked in the water sector ever 
since. Isarra has been one of the organic intellectuals in Peru’s movement for 
public water (see, for example, Isarra 2004). The Peruvian government sees Isarra 
as such a threat that in August of 2008, it pressured Isarra’s employer (the water 
company in Arequipa) to revoke his paid time off for trade union duties and 
activities, offering to grant seven new accreditations should the union agree to 
the withdrawal of Luis Isarra’s accreditation. Thanks to an international letter 
campaign, Isarra’s paid leave was restored. Maintaining the protection for union 
officers remains a constant struggle for trade unions in Peru. 
The existence of a strong union federation at the national level in Peru but 
not in Bolivia explains why Peruvian water unions have adopted a strategy to 
form deep coalitions with community groups to defend public services against 
privatization, while no such strategy has emerged in Bolivia. This difference 
owes to the institutional contexts in which these unions find themselves in, 
particularly the history of decentralization. In Bolivia, water workers’ unions 
have been isolated from each other since the water sector was decentralized over 
30 years ago. Municipal water companies were created by presidential decree in 
the 1960s and 1970s when authoritarian regimes transferred the provision of 
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infrastructure for water services to newly-created regional offices of central 
government (Nickson and Vargas 2002: 101). As a result, no national-level 
federation exists for workers in the water sector in Bolivia. Instead, the SEMAPA 
union is affiliated to a national federation that represents workers in various 
sectors, the Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Luz, Fuerza, 
Telecomunicaciones, Agua y Gas de Bolivia (Union Confederation of Light, 
Electricity, Telecommunications, Water and Gas Workers of Bolivia), a loosely-
organized peak association that has remained silent on issues of privatization. 
Indeed, the affiliates of the Confederación remain divided on the issue of 
privatization and therefore there is little support offered for the adoption of 
innovative organizing strategies “from above.”4  
By contrast, the FENTAP has linked up with a global union federation 
and NGOs that have played key roles in supporting innovative organizing 
strategies to defend public services in Peru. Indeed, FENTAP leader Luis Isarra 
has been one of the leading personalities in the transnational networks to defend 
the right to water worldwide. FENTAP was a founding organization of the Red 
Vida (“Network of Life”), the network of unions and social justice organizations 
established to defend the right to water in the Americas. Crucially, FENTAP is 
one of the most active partner organizations with the Public Services 
International (PSI), a global trade union federation which supports public sector 
union campaigns against privatization worldwide. PSI and the Reclaiming Public 
Water Network of the Transnational Institute (RPW-TNI) based in Amsterdam 
have been strong promoters of the concept of the public-public partnership as an 
alternative way to achieve modernization without privatization. The basic 
concept is to match a strong public utility with technical expertise with a 
struggling public utility. With the aid of trips and workshops financed in part by 
the PSI and the RPW-TNI, the management of SEDAM-Huancayo signed a 
partnership agreement with the union that runs the public water company for 
the province of Buenos Aires (SOSBA) in June 2007.  
At the local level, the support offered to the coalition of the Frente and 
SUTAPAHA by the public-public partnership has added a much-needed boost to 
the struggle for reform of the local utility, which is widely considered to be 
poorly managed. The coalition has met with resistance from local politicians in 
particular. One local politician, for example, asked local organizers point blank 
where he would find jobs for the people that worked on his political campaign if 
the municipal council no longer had control over management decisions in the 
public utility. A technical study conducted by SOSBA engineer found that the 
utility’s payroll could be cut by 35% if the number of unit managers was reduced 
from 16 to 5. Understandably, local officials have been slow to embrace the idea 
of the public-public partnership, knowing that their “botín político” (political 
booty) is being threatened.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The revitalization and renewal of trade unions is important in the public 
sector in Latin America where the quality of public services has often been 
undermined by patron-client relationships at the local level. In many cases, such 
as in the municipal water companies in Huancayo, Peru and Cochabamba, 
Bolivia, politicians have used public utilities as a way to distribute political 
favours to friends, relatives and political allies. Considering the need to 
democratize public utilities, the emergence of labour-community coalitions has 
been one of the positive outcomes of the struggles against privatization. Activists 
are building on the relationships forged in struggle to push for the 
democratization of their own unions and public utilities, two important steps on 
the path to modernization of public utilities without privatization. 
As we have seen in the case of Peru, union revitalization has been a “top 
down” process dependent on the presence of a strong national federation that 
provides ideological and financial support for innovation with the help of its 
international allies. While these campaigns have successful stymied 
privatization, what effect these “deep coalitions” have, if any, on the internal 
union dynamics at the local level are yet unclear. While the decentralization of 
the water sector in Bolivia inhibits the adoption of a common national strategy, 
there is some indication that the SEMAPA workers’ involvement in community 
coalition is facilitating a “bottom up” process of trade union renewal. Insurgents 
within the water workers’ union in Cochabamba have successfully thrown out a 
corrupt union leadership. In future research on alternatives to privatization, 
more attention needs to be paid to the possible links between renewal and 
revitalization in the struggles to democratize trade unions and service delivery 
more broadly.    
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1. As David Camfield (2007) argues, it is necessary to distinguish between “mobilization unionism” and 
the more radical, democratic “social movement unionism” in which the union is controlled by the 
rank and file, since the adoption of social movement tactics can be a progressive façade in a 
undemocratic union.  
2. Ken Roberts (2008: 6) estimates that trade union density in the 1990s was only about 13 percent, down 
from its height of about 22 percent at the peak level of labor mobilization during the era of import 
substitution industrialization. 
3. Miners’ unions have been particularly combative both in the past and present. See, inter alia, Laite 
(1980) and De Echave (2005) on Peru and Nash (1979) and Webber (2005) on Bolivia. 
4. The electricity workers in who are affiliated with the Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores Luz, 
Fuerza, Telecomunicaciones, Agua y Gas of Bolivia, for example, supported the governments’ 
privatization agenda and eventually become major shareholders in the newly privatized power 
companies (Rojas 2006).  
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